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TOXIC CHEMICALS (fr.M.M
the exercise of utmost care will not free one
from liability for damages resulting from an
abnormally dangerous activity. Section 520 of
the Second Restatement of Torts lists six factors
which determine whether an activity is abnor-
mally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land or chattels of an-
other; (b) likelihood that the harm that results
from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate
the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d)
extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the
activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
3 Restatement, Torts 2d, § 520 at 36 (1976).
The appellate court determined that the han-
dling and disposal of toxic waste is an "abnor-
mally dangerous" activity and that the risk of
harm should not fall on the victim. Because
radium tailings are toxic waste, USRC's dumping
constituted an abnormally dangerous activity
for which it could be held strictly liable.
Next, the court considered USRC's knowl-
edge of the health risks associated with radium,
noting that whether USRC had knowledge that
radium tailings were an abnormally dangerous
substance was relevant to a determination of
absolute liability. In a 1943 letter, USRC's presi-
dent cited four incidents in which employees
had died from exposure to radium. Both the
letter and an informational pamphlet prepared
in part by USRC revealed the company's knowl-
edge of the hazards of radioactive compounds.
Moreover, between 1917 and 1943, the plant em-
ployee who measured radon wore a lead-lined
apron and numerous signs warned employees
not to sharpen brushes of luminous paint with
their mouths, as this procedure was known to
cause cancer. Exposure to radiation had ren-
dered one plant engineer sterile. When radon
became impacted under his fingernail, the com-
pany president voluntarily cut off his entire
finger.
The appellate court disagreed with the trial
court's conclusion that the doctrine of caveat
emptor barred T & E's suit. The appellate court
considered the doctrine outdated, widely aban-
doned and inapplicable. Because T & E did not
knowingly accept the radium-contaminated
property, the court refused to allow USRC to
escape liability by claiming that T & E bought the
property at its own risk.
The court characterized USRC's conduct as a
"continuing tort" because the dangers associ-
ated with the decaying radium were continuous
even though the dumping had occurred many
years earlier. Because the law provides that liabil-
ity for a continuing tort falls on the party origi-
nally responsible for the contamination, the
innocent successors in title who did not dump
radium tailings on the property did not share in
the liability. The appellate court noted that
" '[tihose who poison the land must pay for its
cure.' " 546 A.2d at 578, citing cases. The court
reversed the judgment in favor of USRC, di-
rected the trial court to enter judgment on the
issue of liability in favor of T & E, and ordered a
new trial on the issue of damages.
Debbie Williams
ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
HOLDS COCA-COLA NOT
CAUSE OF ILLNESS SUFFERED
IMMEDIATELY AFTER
CONSUMPTION
In Warren v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 166 III.
App. 3d 566, 519 N.E.2d 1197 (111. App. 1988), the
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, held
that a plaintiff presented no genuine issue of
material fact to support her allegation that bac-
teria present in the soft drink she consumed
caused her illness. Consequently, the court af-
firmed the trial court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants Coca-Cola
Company ("Coca-Cola") and Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Company of Chicago ("the Bottling Com-
pany").
Background
Warren purchased a can of Coca-Cola at Litt's
Cut Rate drug store. The can appeared clean and
the soft drink was carbonated as usual. Warren
took one large gulp of the soda, which tasted
terrible. Within five minutes she became ill.
Warren immediately went to a hospital where
her condition worsened. She informed the emer-
gency room physician that she became sick after
consuming the cola. Consequently, he listed the
diagnosis on the emergency room report as
"acute gastritis" caused by ingestion of coca-
cola, and admitted her as a patient.
Warren remained in the hospital for six days
during which time she experienced stomach
cramps, diarrhea and vomiting. Her treating
physician failed to pinpoint the exact cause of
her illness. He advised her that the soft drink
"could have" caused her illness, but because the
hospital was not equipped to analyze the soda,
he could not be sure.
During Warren's stay in the hospital, the can
was covered with aluminum foil and stored in
her mother's refrigerator. Upon her discharge,
Warren delivered the can to the Chicago Board
of Health for analysis. The tests performed indi-
cated the sanitary condition of the soft drink and
identified pathogens which could have caused
food poisoning.
A bacteriologist discovered the presence of
approximately 1300 streptococci fecalis bacteria
per gram in the soft drink. This amount indi-
cated that the soft drink was "insanitary" but not
necessarily capable of causing disease. During
her deposition, the bacteriologist stated that
nearly a million streptococci fecalis organisms
are necessary to cause food poisoning in human
beings. She also stated that a soft drink can
which was originally sterile is likely to become
insanitary after remaining open for six days. The
streptococci test only indicated the amount of
bacteria present at the time the soft drink was
tested, so a greater number of bacteria could
have been present prior to testing. Warren
showed the results to her physician. He again
stated only that the presence of bacteria was
abnormal and "could have" caused her illness.
Warren filed suit against Coca-Cola, the Bot-
tling Company and Litt's Cut Rate alleging breach
of an implied warranty, strict liability and negli-
gence. After extensive discovery, Coca-Cola and
the Bottling Company moved for summary judg-
ment. In its motion for summary judgment,
Coca-Cola argued that neither the pleadings
nor deposition testimony indicated that the bac-
teria in the soft drink caused Warren's illness,
and attached the affidavits of two company vice
presidents to support its position. One affidavit
established that Coca-Cola manufactured only
the Coca-Cola syrup and not the soft drink itself.
The second affidavit established that the syrup
was manufactured in an entirely closed system,
was laboratory tested prior to packaging in ste-
rile containers, and was not contaminated be-
fore being shipped to the Bottling Company. In
its motion for summary judgment the Bottling
Company also argued that neither the pleadings
nor the deposition testimony indicated that the
bacteria in the soft drink caused Warren's illness.
The Bottling Company reasoned that any such
conclusion was drawn by Warren herself and not
by a physician or bacteriologist.
In her attempt to rebut this evidence, Warren
relied on several documents. First, she recited
portions of her deposition testimony in which
she had stated that the Coca-Cola tasted bad and
that she became sick immediately after consum-
ing it. Second, Warren referred to the bacteriol-
ogist's determination that the soft drink was
insanitary. Third, she referred to the emergency
room physician's report which established the
soda as the causal link to her illness. After a
hearing, the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Coca-Cola and the Bottling
Company. No judgment was entered for or
against Litt's Cut Rate.
The Appellate Court's Analysis: Applicable
Standards for Prevailing on Claims of Strict
Liability or Negligence
The only issue on appeal was whether War-
ren's injury was caused by a dangerous amount
of streptococci fecalis present at the time the
soft drink was consumed. The appellate court
began its analysis by examining the pleadings,
deposition transcripts and affidavits filed by
both sides. If those documents, as a whole, failed
to present a genuine issue of material fact, then
Coca-Cola and the Bottling Company were
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law, and the trial court's order would be sus-
tained.
Coca-Cola and the Bottling Company manu-
factured the syrup and soft drink and sold the
final product in a sealed can for purchase and
human consumption. An implied warranty of
fitness is imposed upon manufacturers that their
product is suitable for human consumption.
Warren was entitled to recover damages if she
proved that either the syrup or the soft drink was
not fit for human consumption or was defective.
In order to prevail on either a theory of breach
of implied warranty or defective product, War-
ren had to establish that the condition of the
cola was the same when it left the defendants'
control as it was when she drank it. Warren could
also recover damages under a theory of negli-
gence if she proved that the defendants
breached their duty to adequately prepare,
inspect and package their products.
The court stressed that "the mere fact that
injury occurs in consumption of the product
does not alone raise a presumption, or other-
wise create an inference, under any of the above
theories, entitling the consumer to recover
against the manufacturer." 519 N.E.2d at 1202.
For Warren to rebut the evidence presented by
Coca-Cola and the Bottling Company, she had
to set forth facts from which the trial court could
have inferred: 1) that the cola was contaminated
at the time Warren consumed it; 2) that Warren's
illness was a direct result of the contamination;
and 3) that Coca-Cola and the Bottling Company
were responsible for the contamination.
The Court's Holding: No Proof that Cola
Caused Illness
First, the appellate court concluded that War-
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ren's evidence was insufficient to establish that
either defendant was responsible for contami-
nation of the soft drink. Coca-Cola testified that
its product was sanitary because it was manufac-
tured in a closed system. Warren offered no evi-
dence to rebut this assertion because she failed
to present any evidence tending to show that
the syrup was contaminated when it left the
control of Coca-Cola. In addition, Warren failed
to show that the soft drink was contaminated
when it left the control of the Bottling Company.
Second, the court rejected Warren's argument
that the emergency room physician's report
established a causal link between the soft drink
and Warren's illness because the report merely
recited information which Warren had reported
to the physician. The court reasoned that War-
ren's own speculation as to the origin of her
illness was insufficient to establish actual cause.
Moreover, both the bacteriologist and the emer-
gency room physician concluded that the con-
taminated soft drink was a possible cause of
Warren's illness. The court declared that a possi-
bility was insufficient to raise an inference of
fact.
Finally, the court found no conclusive proof
that the soft drink was contaminated when
Warren consumed it. The bacteriologist's deter-
mination that bacteria was present might have
been sufficient had the can been tested imme-
diately, but six days had passed between con-
sumption and testing. Therefore, the test results
were insufficient to raise an inference that the
cola caused Warren's illness.
The court concluded that Warren failed to
present sufficient evidence that the cola was
contaminated when she consumed it. But even
if it had been contaminated, the court con-
cluded Warren failed to prove that the contami-
nation caused her illness, or that defendants
were responsible for the contamination. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment in favor of Coca-Cola and the Bottling
Company.
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